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This paper focuses on the effects of age-structure changes on the size of budget 
deficits of national governments.  More specifically, it determines whether differences in 
age structure can account for the observed differences in budget deficits across 
countries as well as across time.  Via an extension of the untested theory of negative 
bequest motives advocated by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), this paper argues that the 
commonly accepted notion that population aging tends to increase the budget deficits of 
economies is theoretically consistent. However, preliminary results from country and 
time fixed-effects panel regressions, estimated from 1975 to 1992 over 55 developed 
and developing countries, indicate statistical evidence for this postulation is present only 
in the developing countries but not in the developed countries. 
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1.  Recognition of the Problem of Population Aging 
  It has been a traditional notion that a country's demographic factors have little 
effect on the macroeconomy.  However, in recent years, the effects of demography on 
the economy has been receiving much more attention.  The new interest in population 
economics is largely in response to the overwhelming concern with population aging.  
Population aging, the demographic phenomenon which entails an increase in the 
percentage share of the elderly
1 in the total population, was previously associated only 
with the developed countries.  However, in recent years, trends of declining fertility rates, 
a dominant cause of population aging, have began to surface in the developing and less 
developed countries as well. 
  While it is true that population aging in these developing and less developed 
countries is still in the relatively early stages, the projected rates of increase of these 
elderly populations for the near future, on the other hand, is staggering.  Up to 2025, 
Asia and Latin America are expected to have the largest percentage increases in the 
share of the elderly population.  This is most disconcerting as it implies that these   
developing countries will be achieving levels of population aging at much lower levels of 
per capita income than the industrial countries did, and would probably therefore not 
have sufficiently developed social security programs for universal coverage. 
  While the growth of the elderly share for many countries is projected to increase, 
the growth of the share of working age populations have been projected to decrease.  
These declines arise from the combined impact of low fertility rates on the working-age 
population entrants and the maturation of large cohorts into retirement.  In addition, the 
labor force participation rates of men both above and below the normal retirement age 
have fallen sharply (OECD, 1988).  The above effects would reduce the size of the labor 
force and as such, given present trends, there will not only be a larger elderly population 
to be supported but also a smaller working population to support it.  This implies that the 
burden shouldered by each working person is likely to increase substantially in the near 
future.  If this trend goes unchecked, population aging could very well lead to the 
collapse of many pay-as-you-go social security systems in the world the early part of this 
century. 
  Thus, population aging, being a global phenomenon, is causing deep concerns in 
both the developed and developing countries.  As such, much research in demographic 
economics has been performed in the hope of finding a way to avert the impending old-
age crises. 
                                                  
1An elderly person is defined as an individual who is at least of age 65.   3  
  Given the above mentioned concerns, this paper investigates, by way of 
econometric techniques, the effects of the changes in age structure on the central 
government budget deficits of national governments.  Following conventional wisdom, I 
argue in this paper that increases in the population share of the elderly will tend to 
increase the budget deficit and estimate fixed-effects panel regressions using data for 
55 countries to verify the validity of this postulation. 
 
 
2.  Population Age Structure Changes and the Budget Deficit 
 
2.1  The Effects of the Elderly Share on the Budget Deficit 
The above changes in the age structure of the population bear significant impact 
on the level of public social expenditure and consequently, holding other things constant, 
the size of the budget deficit. 
An unexpected rise in the population share of the elderly due to improved 
longevity tends to increase the budget deficit because this will increase the amount of 
social security benefits that are paid out to the elderly by the government.  Such social 
programs are largely financed by taxes and social security contributions collected from 
the working population.  Since the size of the elderly population relative to that of the 
working population also increases with the elderly share, holding other things constant, 
the benefits that are paid out will tend to exceed the revenue collected for such 
programs.  This consequently means that the government, in order to keep such social 
programs viable, must increase the level of taxes and social security contributions being 
collected from the working population or decrease the level of social security benefits 
being paid out to the elderly, or run a budget deficit by financing some of the social 
security benefits by bond issuance
2. 
Population aging also tends to lead to an increase in the government deficit by 
increasing the government's expenditure on health care.  Surveys conducted in OECD 
countries show that public expenditure on health care is significantly higher for older 
persons than for the remainder of the population.  This is predominantly due to health 
problems and costly medical technologies being concentrated on the old.  As such, an 
increase in the share of the aged generally leads to an increase in government 
expenditure on public health care services, which consequently, with a given level of tax 
revenue, tends to increase the budget deficit. 
                                                  
2Of course, there is also the obvious choice of using any combination of the three options. 
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  From a long-run perspective, an increase in the retired elderly share also tends 
to increase the budget deficit by decreasing the tax base of the economy.  This 
hypothesis builds on the argument used in Bloom and Williamson (1997)
3.  An increase 
in the elderly share decreases the amount of per capita labor resource of the economy 
because an elderly person generally either works less than a person who is of working-
age or does not work at all.  With less per capita labor input, per capita income tends to 
be lower, leading to a lower level of income tax revenues, and consequently, the budget 
deficit increases. 
  In addition to working less, elderly persons also tend to dissave more than the 
average working-age individual.  This implies that an economy with a larger elderly 
share, other things held constant, will tend to have a lower level of savings as compared 
to one with a smaller elderly share
4.  With a lower savings level, investment tends to be 
at a lower level which will lead to a lower level of per capita income and income tax 
revenues and consequently, a larger budget deficit. 
  In short, an economy with a larger elderly share of total population tends to have 
a larger budget deficit because of the tendency of increased social expenditures on 
health and social security and also because of lower per capita income due to lower 
level of labor and capital inputs into the economy. 
 
 
2.2  The Effects of the Youth Share on the Budget Deficit  
  Similar to that of the elderly, an increase in the share of the youth in the total 
population tends to have an effect of increasing the budget deficit.  With a larger share 
of the population as young persons, public expenditures by the government which are 
specifically directed at the youth, such as education expenditures, will increase. 
  Again similar to that of the elderly, a larger youth share will also imply that there 
are relatively less workers and savers in the economy.  As such, the levels of per capita 
labor inputs and investment will be less, leading to a lower level of per capita income 
and income tax revenues and a larger budget deficit. 
 
                                                  
3Bloom and Williamson (1997) postulated and empirically demonstrated that an increase in the 
growth rate of the share of the dependent population, which includes both young and elderly 
persons, tends to decrease the rate of per capita income growth because the young and elderly 
work and save less. 
 
4In an empirical study covering 80 over countries, Kelley (1988) finds that increases in the elderly 
share lead to statistically significant decreases in the aggregate saving rate.   5  
2.3.  Dependency Ratios and the Budget Deficit 
  Rather than looking at the various age-group shares of the population, it is very 
common to study the variations in the youth and elderly dependency ratios as indicators 
of changes in the age structure of the population. 
  The elderly dependency ratio
5 represents the size of the elderly population 
relative to that of the working-age population and has been projected to increase in all 
major regions of the world due to the effects of population aging.  An increase in the 
elderly dependency ratio implies that the size of the elderly population has increased 
faster than that of the working population, and for reasons discussed above, should lead 
to an increase in the budget deficit. 
  Similarly, the young or youth dependency ratio is the number of young persons in 
the population divided by the number of persons in the working-age population.  An 
increase in the youth dependency ratio implies that the size of the elderly population has 
increased faster than that of the working population, and should also lead to an increase 
in the budget deficit. 
 
 
2.4  Population Aging and the Budget Deficit : A Simple Model of 
Overlapping Generations 
  To show mathematically in a simple way the effects of a larger share of the 
elderly population on the government budget deficit, we borrow from Diamond (1965) the 
standard overlapping generations model.  It is thus assumed that each individual lives, 
without uncertainty, for two time periods.  Every individual works when they are young, 
during the first period of their lives, and retires when they are old, in the second period of 
their lives.  Wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible so that full employment prevails.  
Let Nt  be the number of persons in the young (working) population in period t and nt  be 
the growth rate of the young population in period t.  This implies that: 
 
) 1 ( 1 t t t n N N + = +  
 
In any time period t, only two cohorts coexist, the young population of period t 
and the elderly population of period t, which was the young population of time period t-1.  
The total population in time period t, TPt,  can be thus written as : 
                                                  
5The elderly dependency ratio is defined as the number of persons aged at least 65 to the 
number of persons aged between 15 and 64 multiplied by 100.  It is interpreted as the number of 





















This consequently implies that the elderly share of the total population in time period t 



























Notice the negative relationship that exists between the share of the elderly population 
and the growth rate of the young population : the lower the growth rate of the young 
population, the larger the share of the elderly population. 
Further assume the presence of a government which runs a pay-as-you-go social 
security system.  The government taxes each young individual a fixed amount T and 
pays out a fixed amount of social security benefits, SSB,  to each old individual.  The 
lump-sum taxes, T,  that are levied on every young agent are set such that, given the 
amount of social security benefits, SSB, for every old agent in period 0, the government 
will have a balanced budget.  Thus by equating the total expenditures of the government 


















Let  n  denote the young population growth rate that yields a balanced 
government budget in time period 0 and by definition it must equal to n-1.  We can 
therefore rewrite the previous equation as : 
 
T n SSB ) 1 ( + =  
Let D1 be the budget deficit in period 1.  In this simple model it is mathematically 
expressed as the difference between the total government expenditure in period 1 and 
the total amount of taxes collected in period 1 :   7  
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It can be seen from above that given the lump-sum taxes, T, and social security 
benefits, SSB, that the growth rate of the young population determines the size of the 
budget deficit and if it falls below n , a budget deficit would result.  Thus in this simple 
model, the lower the growth rate of the young population the larger the budget deficit. 
Recall that it has been shown that a lower growth rate of the young population 
also leads to a larger share of the elderly in the population.  As such, there exists a 
positive association between the elderly share of the total population and the size of the 
budget deficit : a lower growth rate of the young population will lead to an increase in the 




3.  The Theory of Negative Bequest Motives 
In this section, we provide a brief description of another prominent theory of 
budget deficits that can be extended to explain the effects of age-structure changes on 
the budget deficit. 
  Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) focused on intergenerational redistributive effects 
of public debt, and proposed a political economy, general equilibrium model of debt and 
deficits based on intergenerational transfers.  They argue that there exist bequest-
constrained individuals who would like to transfer resources from future generations to 
finance current consumption, via negative bequests.  As mentioned, since such negative 
bequests are typically not socially enforceable, bequest-constrained individuals will favor 
any fiscal policy that decreases current taxes without decreasing current government 
expenditures.  Thus, in a democratic political system, the larger the share of bequest-
constrained individuals in the population, the more likely is the government to run larger 
deficits.  Based on this scenario, Cukierman and Meltzer theory of negative bequest 
motives postulate that increases in the expected rate of economic growth, the spread of   8  
the income distribution or expected longevity tends to increase the population share of 
bequest-constrained individuals, which will consequently lead to larger budget deficits. 
 
 
3.1  The Theoretical Framework 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), using an overlapping generations model with 
bequests, attempted to identify the factors that determine the size of budget deficits by 
focusing only on the redistributive role of the government.  By doing so, they abstract 
from the function of the government as a provider of public goods and also from issues 
that relate to the minimization of the deadweight loss of taxation over time. 
 
Main Assumptions of the Model 
The economy is represented by an overlapping generations structure with 
bequests.  The population is assumed to be stationary and the number of individuals in 
each generation, denoted by N, is identical across periods.  Their model assumes there 
is no uncertainty, taxes are levied in a lump-sum fashion on the young, and the old 
receive Social Security benefits.  Individuals work only when young and each supplies 
inelastically one unit of labor each period.  There exists differences in ability and, 
consequently, in wage rates across individuals.  The production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale technology. 
Individuals are able to transfer wealth from the first to second period of life by 
means of savings either in the form of government bonds or capital investment.   Familial 
intergenerational transfers, if any, are assumed to flow only from the parent to the child, 
that is, such transfers exist only in the form of bequests. The amount of bequests differs 
across individuals.  As will be explained below, the position of each individual in the 
distribution of wealth, his wage rate and the wage rates he expects for future 
generations in his family determine his attitude toward the size of the budget deficit.  
Given individual preferences, majority rule determines the current period debt size and 
the current taxes chosen by voters. 
Government expenditure is financed by a combination of lump-sum taxes on the 
young and issuance of one-period government bonds that have to be repaid with interest 
in the next period.  The government budget constraint therefore implies that total current 
expenditure, consisting of social security payments plus the principal and interest 
payments on last period's government bonds, must be equal to total current revenue,   9  
consisting of the above mentioned lump sum taxes and new bond issue.  The 
government budget constraint, normalized by the number of young or old individuals, N, 
can be thus written as: 
 
t t t t t b T b r S + = + + − − 1 1) 1 (         ( 1 )  
 
where 
t S   is the social security payments paid out to the old in period t 
1 − t r   is the interest rate for period t-1 
1 − t b   is the amount of bonds issued in period t-1
6 
t b   is the amount of bonds issued in period t 
t T   is the amount of taxes levied in period t 
 
Rearranging, we get the size of the budget deficit,  
t t t t t T b r S b − + + = − − 1 1) 1 (         ( 2 )  
 
which also denotes the stock of government debt in period t, since all bonds are one-
period bonds. 
 
Bequest Motives and Preferences over the Budget Deficit 
Cukierman and Meltzer argue that Barro's (1974) government debt neutrality 
theorem does not hold when individuals differ in productivity, wage earnings, and also in 
their initial endowment.  This is because these differences will give rise to some 
individuals who would like to leave a negative bequest to their descendants.  However, 
such bequests cannot be discharged, as there are no institutional arrangements that can 
obligate their descendants to do so.  The minimum bequest is thus constrained to zero 
and individuals who desire to leave negative bequests are termed as bequest-
constrained individuals. 
Clearly, such bequest-constrained individuals will favor a fiscal policy that 
increases their lifetime income at the expense of future generations even when the 
                                                  
6 Note that all government bonds issued are one-period bonds.  This implies that bonds issued in 
the preceding period must be retired and repaid in full with interest in the next period.   10  
present value of the tax change is zero.  For example, increased social security benefits 
financed by debt issue shift taxes forward (that is, into the future) and allow bequest-
constrained individuals to achieve a higher level of consumption.  Thus, with such 
individuals, the issuance of government debt will not be neutral.  All other things equal, 
under a majority rule political system, this implies a larger share of the population that is 
bequest-constrained will tend to lead to a larger budget deficit. 
Cukierman and Meltzer further argue that, in their general equilibrium framework, 
even an individual who is not bequest-constrained, may still not be indifferent to a 
reallocation of resources over time that maintains present value.  According to them, if 
there exist any bequest-constrained individuals in the economy, a present-value-
preserving exchange of taxes for public debt will increase the consumption of those 
individuals.  These bequest-constrained individuals must obtain the required resources 
for additional consumption from the non-bequest-constrained, who substitute bonds for 
real capital in their portfolios.  While bonds and capital are perfect substitutes in 
portfolios, they are not perfect substitutes in production.  The additional debt crowds out 
some capital
7, raising the return to capital and decreasing the return to labor.   
Consequently, individuals will favor a debt increase if their income is largely capital 
income and will be against a debt increase if their income is mainly labor income
8. 
 
  Based on the above model, Cukierman and Meltzer postulate that budgetary 
deficits will be larger under majority rule, 
i.  the larger the expected long-run growth rate of the economy 
ii.  the larger the spread of the income distribution 
iii.  the higher the longevity 
 
i.  All other things being equal, the higher the expected rate of future economic 
growth, the more the current generation will expect future generations to be 
relatively better off. This tends to increase not only the probability that the current 
generation will want to reallocate resources from the future to the present, but 
                                                  
7 The amount of capital that is crowded out by an additional unit of debt depends on the fraction 
of bequest-constrained individuals in the economy and on the extent to which they are 
constrained. 
 
8 It is realized that for small open economies, the issue of addition government debt will not lead 
to an increase in interest rates and thus no crowding out of capital will occur.  This point will be 
reiterated in a later section when the regression results are analyzed.   11  
also increases the amount of resources that is likely to be transferred.  As such, 
economic growth tends to increase the number of individuals with negative 
bequest motives and also increases the degree to which individuals are bequest 
constrained, thus leading to a larger budget deficit under majority rule. 
 
ii.  Cukierman and Meltzer argue that individuals with extreme amounts of income 
and wealth tend to favor more debt issuance.  Individuals with low incomes will 
tend to be bequest constrained, while individuals with high incomes tend to have 
capital income as their main source of income.  Both of these groups of 
individuals will vote for more debt financing, but for different reasons
9.  Hence, 
the larger the spread of the distribution of income or total wealth, the larger the 
probability of having a larger budget deficit. 
 
iii.  Higher expected longevity tends to increase the expected length of time an 
individual spends in retirement
10.  This tends to increase the required amount of 
resources necessary to sustain consumption in the retirement years.  Thus a 
higher expected longevity will tend to increase the proportion of the population 
who prefer negative bequests and also the size of the negative bequest that is 
preferred.  This, in turn, tends to lead to a larger budget deficit, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
3.2  An Extension to the Theory of Negative Bequest Motives 
In view of Cukierman and Meltzer’s postulation that an increase in expected 
longevity tends to increase the population share of bequest constrained individuals, it is 
obvious that it should not only be increases in expected longevity but also the number of 
persons who are actually in retirement that increases the population share of bequest 
constrained individuals.  Thus, ceteris paribus, the larger the number of retired persons 
in the economy, the larger the number of persons who require additional resources for 
consumption during retirement, the larger the likelihood that the population share of 
bequest constrained individuals in the economy and consequently the larger the budget 
                                                                                                                                                
 
9 Recall that the return to capital tends to increase in debt issuance in the Cukierman-Meltzer 
model. 
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deficit.  This implies that an increase in the elderly population share should have a 
positive effect on the size of the budget deficit. 
Using similar arguments, it should also be true that an increase in the working-
age population share should decrease the decrease the population share of bequest 
constrained individuals thereby leading to smaller budget deficits.  Thus, an increase in 




4.  Other Variables and the Budget Deficit 
Before an empirical investigation into the issue of whether changes in age-
structure are significant driving forces behind the size of a country’s budget deficit can 
be carried out, other structural and political variables that influence the size of the deficit 
must be first accounted for.  There are 4 other main classes of variables that have been 
suggested in the literature to have significant effects on the size of the budget deficit of a 
country.  They are 
1.  structural variables that determine or reflect the level of efficiency of the tax 
system in a country, 
2. macroeconomic  variables, 
3.  political variables representing the level of political instability and political 
polarization in a country, and 
4. tax-smoothing  variables. 
 
 
4.1  The Efficiency of the Tax System 
The efficiency of the tax system has been emphasized by Edwards and Tabellini 
(1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992) as an important determinant of the size of the budget 
deficit.  They noted that an economy with an inefficient tax system, holding other factors 
constant, cannot collect as large an amount of tax revenues as an economy with an 
efficient tax system.  This is primarily because an inefficient tax system has higher costs 
                                                                                                                                                
10 Thus the case in which higher longevity increases the length of an individual’s working life is 
not considered. 
11 We are aware that our Bloom and Williamson type postulation that increases in the youth 
population share tends to increase the budget deficit is not explained by the theory of negative 
bequest motives. 
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of tax collection and administration, not to mention more widespread tax evasion.   
Because of this lower level of tax revenues, economies with inefficient tax systems tend 
to have larger (and more monetized) budget deficits as compared to economies with 
efficient tax systems for any given level of government expenditure. 
Because the taxing capacity of a country is technologically constrained by the 
structure of its economy and its stage of economic development, factors influencing the 
level of efficiency of the tax system in a country can be grouped into two categories
12: 
variables that account for the sectoral composition of GDP, and the stage of economic 
development. 
The agricultural sector might be the hardest sector of the economy to tax.  Its 
typically non-corporate structure facilitates tax evasion.  Therefore, the larger the relative 
size of the agricultural sector in an economy, the higher the costs of administration and 
enforcement of tax collections will be.  This implies a less efficient tax system, thus 
leading to a larger budget deficit for a given level of government expenditures. 
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector is generally regarded as one of the 
easiest to tax.  This is because, in sharp contrast to the agricultural sector, the 
manufacturing industry is largely corporate in structure, making it less capable of tax 
evasion.  Thus, when an economy has a relatively large manufacturing sector, it should 
face lower tax enforcement costs implying a more efficient tax system, and consequently 
it should have a smaller budget deficit. 
A third sectoral share, imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP, measures the 
foreign trade sector of the economy.  Import and export taxes are commonly regarded as 
a cheap tax base because they are relatively easy to assess and collect since such 
foreign traded commodities must pass through a limited number of frontier ports, and are 
usually handled by a few wholesalers.  The ease of collecting such taxes is one reason 
why countries with extensive foreign trade typically collect a greater proportion of public 
revenues in the form of import and export duties than countries with limited external 
trade (Todaro, 1997).  An economy with a larger foreign sector, ceteris paribus, should 
therefore be able to collect more tax revenue thus leading to a smaller budget deficit. 
Finally, since tax collection costs are likely to be smaller in urban areas than in 
rural areas.  As such, the higher the urban population share out of the total population 
should be negatively associated with the budget deficit. 
                                                  
12 See Cukierman et al. (1992) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991). 
   14  
 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic  Variables 
a.  Level of Economic Development 
To control for the potential effects of economic development on the cross-country 
differences in budget deficits, several different measures of the level of per capita real 
GDP will be used.  Possible measures include real GDP per capita and a measure of 
potential or trend real GDP per capita.  Detailed description of the construction of these 
variables will be given in the appendix. 
 
b.  Accounting for Money Creation 
  The budget deficit can be defined as the sum of the different ways in which it can 
be financed.  Typically, budget deficits can be financed either by borrowing from the 
public or by seigniorage
13, which implies that the budget deficit can be written as: 
 
Budget Deficit    =  Non-monetized Debt Issue  +  Change in Base Money 
 
The bequest motive theory of budget deficits hinges wholly on the assumption that the 
deficit is financed by public debt issuance.  Therefore, if a country runs a large budget 
deficit and finances it by monetizing it, the bequest motive theory provides no 
explanation as to why the budget deficit should arise.  This is because monetization of 
                                                  
13Note that there are countries for which the budget deficit is not equal to the sum of the debt 
issued or retired and the amount of money created.  For example, Singapore has been generally 
running budget surpluses since the 1980s; however, its stock of government debt has been 
increasing.  This implies that the Singapore government has chosen not to pay off debts that it 
owes to the public, even though it has the surpluses to do so.  In fact, it has chosen to borrow 
even more, in spite of accumulating large government reserves due to the many years of budget 
surpluses.  This interesting case of Singapore, which provides a contradiction to the above 
"identity", illustrates that it is not always the case that when a country runs a budget surplus, the 
stock of national debt should, ceteris paribus, decrease and vice versa, which is clearly assumed 
by Cukierman and Meltzer here and by many others in the literature.  The above equation 
perhaps should be rewritten as: 
 
Budget Deficit = Non-monetized Debt Issue + Money Creation - Change in Government 
Assets 
 
We did not control for changes in government assets due to a lack of available data and because 
changes in government assets is in many ways similar to debt issue, within the framework of the 
negative bequest motive model.  Bequest constrained individuals should be indifferent between 
budget deficits that are financed by public debt issue or by sale of government assets, since in 
both cases current consumption increases at the expense of future generations.    15  
the deficit is equivalent to the imposition of an inflation tax, and this leads to a decrease 
in the real disposable income that should result in an increase the degree to which 
people are bequest-constrained.  Thus, bequest-constrained individuals would not favor 
an increase in the budget deficit that is financed by money creation. 
  As such, when testing the bequest motive theory of budget deficits, it is 
necessary to control for the seigniorage-financed portion of the deficit, leaving the 
component of budget deficit that has been financed by debt issuance to be explained by 
bequest-constrained motives
14.  Following Roubini (1991), we use the change in the 
monetary base (as a share of GDP) to control for seigniorage revenue. 
 
c.  Accounting for Interest Payments on Government Debt 
Interest rates are an important factor in determining governments’ costs of debt 
servicing.  Naturally, the costs of debt servicing become more important in countries that 
have a large stock of government debt, such as Belgium, Ireland and Italy.  We will use 
the measure of the budgetary costs of higher interest rates presented in Roubini and 
Sachs (1989b), which is the annual change of the difference between the real interest 






4.3 Political  Instability 
Political instability has been found to play a significant role in the determination of 
the size of the budget deficits
15. 
                                                  
14Roubini and Sachs (1989a) showed that there is some evidence that policymakers treat 
seigniorage and bond issues as alternative ways to finance a budget deficit.  Thus if some 
countries are constrained in their use of seigniorage taxation, they would switch to debt issuance 
to finance a given level of level of budget deficit.  It is clear that in such a case, even if the budget 
deficit is financed by public debt issue, the Cukierman-Meltzer model does not provide an 
explanation for such a component of the budget deficit.  Roubini and Sachs (1989a) also argue 
that due to their commitment to peg to the Deutsche Mark, member countries of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) experienced a reduction in seigniorage collections as they induced a 
slowdown in inflation and they found evidence that the decrease in seigniorage financing was 
accompanied by a more rapid increase in public debt. 
 
15 See Cukierman et al. (1992), Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Roubini (1991).  These papers 
actually argue that both political instability and political polarization are significant determinants of   16  
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) postulate that the more politically unstable a 
country is, the larger will be its budget deficit.  Political instability will raise the frequency 
of government changes and lower the likelihood that a current policymaker will be 
reelected.  Given this, consider a policymaker who is required to choose both the 
intertemporal profile of spending and taxes as well as how to allocate the resources 
acquired by issuing debt.  Suppose that because of political instability in the country, the 
policymaker is aware that in the future he may be replaced by a policymaker or political 
majority with different preferences about some aspects of fiscal policy.  Then he realizes 
that, whereas he is in control of how to allocate the proceeds of his borrowing, the 
allocation of the burden of repaying the debt in the future may not be under his control.  
This asymmetry may prevent the current policymaker from fully internalizing the costs of 
running a deficit, the more so the greater is the difference between his preferences and 
the expected preferences of the future majority.  In simple terms, the policymaker may 
wish to borrow in excess of the optimum and let his successors "pay the bills".  Thus, 
political instability and polarization tends to lead to a larger than optimal size of the 
budget deficit, even if the policymaker and the voters are rational and forward-looking. 
This paper will use the frequency of government crises to proxy for political 
instability
16.  The number of government crises is defined as the number of major 
government crises, defined as any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime – excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow. 
 
 
4.4 Political  Freedom 
                                                                                                                                                
the size of budget deficits.  However, it is noted that a country that is politically polarized may not 
be politically unstable.   For example, a country can have two very different or polarized political 
ideologies and yet be politically stable if the supporters of one of the political ideology form the 
vast majority of the voter population, assuming majority rule.  For this reason we have decided to 
omit the concept of political polarization in our presentation of political instability as a significant 
determinant of budget deficits. 
 
16 It was originally intended to follow Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Roubini (1991) in using 
the frequency of government changes (both regular and irregular) as a measure of political 
instability.  However, the data series for the frequency of government changes or total executive 
transfers obtained from Taylor (1985) is short, ending in 1983.  As such, the number of 
government crises is used as a substitute.  This alternative measure is crude since a government 
crisis does not necessarily lead to a change in the government.  In addition, this measure 
excludes situations of revolt to overthrow the government, which should be included in a measure 
of political instability.   17  
  Recall that Cukierman and Meltzer rely on the majority rule or a democratic 
political system for their theory of budget deficits.  Thus, it is important to control for time 
periods during which citizens of a country may not have the political freedom to vote, 
such as when a country is under a military dictatorship. 
 
 
4.5 Tax-Smoothing  Variables 
Neoclassical theory of fiscal policy is represented by the tax smoothing or 
equilibrium approach to fiscal deficits.  According to this approach, advocated by Barro 
(1979), actual tax and deficits policies are a reflection of an intertemporal optimization 
over a long time horizon by the fiscal authorities, which choose their policies to reduce 
the excess burden of taxation.  It is shown that the excess burden of taxation is 
minimized when the tax rate is constant in every period. 
As a consequence, budget deficits and surpluses are postulated by the theory to 
act as buffers to unanticipated and transitory changes in government expenditures or 
output.  When budget deficits are run, the tax-smoothing approach would argue that the 
economy is probably facing unexpected increases in government expenditures or 
unexpected decreases in output.  On the other hand, if governments were running 
budget surpluses then tax-smoothing advocates would argue that the economy is 
experiencing unexpected decreases in government expenditures or unexpected 
increases in output. 
This implies that increases in unanticipated changes in government expenditures 
should lead to increases in the budget deficit.  On the other hand, increases in 
unanticipated output should lead to decreases in the budget deficit.  Detailed description 




5. Econometric  Methodology 
 
In this paper, we investigate the validity of our theory of the effects of population 
age-structure and the budget deficit by using fixed-effects panel regressions.  The use of 
panel regressions enables us to simultaneously account for intertemporal and cross 
differences in the budget deficits by having both short run (tax-smoothing) and long-run   18  
(bequest motives and age structure) independent variables in the regression 
specification.  In addition, the incorporation of all these variables into a single 
specification allows a simultaneous test to the validity of all of these theories. 
These panel regressions were estimated for the period 1975 to 1992 and both 
country and time fixed effects were used.  Annual observations were used and countries 
did not have the same number of observations
17.  Estimating panel regressions calls for 
particular care in accounting for the dynamic properties of the variables.  In addition to 
the control variables mentioned above, we also include a lagged dependent variable to 
reduce the serial correlation of the error terms. 
 
Missing Data Technique 
A major problem with estimating cross-country regressions that use socio-
economic variables is that there will be many missing observations.  In our case, data on 
the Gini coefficient and life expectancy at age 65 are often sparse and available at 
irregular intervals.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is usually the less 
developed countries with the missing data for these variables, and it is the less 
developed countries that are likely to exhibit bequest constrained behavior.  Thus, the 
exclusion of countries due to the lack of socio-economic (or any) data is likely to 
introduce a systematic bias against the existence of negative bequest motives. 
In an attempt to harvest all the information we can from our data set, we use a 
method developed by Griliches (1986) for the treatment of missing data or observations.  
From the data appendix, it will be seen that we have been able to work around the 
problem of having insufficient observations for elderly life expectancy by obtaining 
predicted values of elderly life expectancy by using data on life expectancy at birth, 
which is highly correlated to elderly life expectancy.  Since we do not have a variable 
that is highly correlated with the Gini coefficient, we will apply this missing data 
technique to the Gini coefficient. 
The technique involves three stages.  In the first stage, we perform the “normal” 
estimation of the fixed effects panel regression with the dependent variable budget 
surplus share being regressed on all independent variables, including the Gini 
coefficient: 
 
                                                  
17 In the jargon of panel data analysis, the panel is “unbalanced”. 
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where 
i   is the country index 
t   is the year or time index 
Ci α   is the country specific effect for country i 
Yt α   is the time specific effect for year t 
1 , − t i Y   is the budget surplus share lagged by one year 
n X  is  the  n
th explanatory variable.   
 
In the second stage, we regress the Gini coefficient on all of the other 
independent variables used in the Stage 1 panel regression and obtain the predicted 







− ∀ + + + + + =
1
2
1 , 1 0 , ) (
N
n
it nit n t i Yt Ci it t i X Y Gini ε γ γ µ µ γ  
where 
Ci µ   is the country specific effect for country i 
Yt µ   is the time specific effect for year t 
 
Using the predicted values of the Gini coefficient from the Stage 2 regression, we 
generate a new variable, say “new Gini”.  This new Gini will take the original value of the 
Gini if it is present, and will take on the predicted value if the actual Gini value is 
missing
19.  This new Gini together with the estimated coefficient of the Gini variable from 
the Stage 1 regression is used to construct a new measure of the dependent variable: 
                                                  
18 Note that the number of explanatory variables only goes up to N-1 because the Gini coefficient 
is excluded. 
 
19 Note that the Stage 1 regression will generate a predicted value of the Gini coefficient for a 
certain country and year so long as none of the other independent variables is missing for that 
country and year.   20  
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Stage 3 of the missing data technique involves the estimation of the regression 
with the new measure of the surplus share as the dependent variable, being regressed 
on all of the independent variables, with the exception of the Gini coefficient: 
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The estimated coefficients will be thus obtained from the Stage 3 Regression, with the 
exception of the Gini variable, which will be obtained from the Stage 1 Regression.   
While this missing data technique does not increase the efficiency of the estimated 
coefficient of the Gini variable, it does allow the rest of the coefficients to be estimated 




                                                                                                                                                
 
20 In order for the coefficients of the non-missing independent variables to be estimated more 
efficiently, the probability of the Gini coefficient being missing must not be correlated with the 
level of the budget surplus share.  We perform a simple rank test where the mean of the budget 
surplus shares for each of the 87 countries over the years 1975 to 1992 is ranked.  By casual 
inspection, we see no correlation between the countries with no Gini data and the level of the 
budget surplus share.   21  
6. Empirical  Results 
From Table 1 we see that both increases in the population shares of the young 
and the elderly tend to decrease the budget surplus shares only in the developing 
countries, with both variables having estimated negative but insignificant coefficients 
(Reg 1b).  For the developed countries, we see that increases in the population shares 
of the youth and aged tend to increase the budget surplus share of GDP with the 
estimated coefficient for the elderly population share being significant (Reg 1a).  We 
therefore see that the data from developing countries tend to support the age structure 
of budget deficits, while those from developed countries do not. 
We alternatively proxy age-structure changes in the population using the 
population shares of the working-age and the elderly and present the results as Reg 2a 
and 2b in Table 1.  We see that increases in the working-age population leads to an 
increase in the budget surplus share and increases in the aged share continues to lead 
to a smaller budget surplus share in developing countries (Reg 2b).   Developed 
countries continue to exhibit estimated coefficients that are theoretically inconsistent with 
the working-age share having a negative coefficient and the elderly share having a 
positive coefficient.  Note that the coefficients of all population share variables, for both 
developed and developing countries, are statistically insignificant.  Thus, in view of our 
regression results, the evidence supporting conventional wisdom that population aging 
tends to lead to budget deficits is weak and only found in the developing countries. 
Due to the relationship between life expectancy and the population share of 
elderly persons in an economy, we note that the correlation between the two variables is 
high, especially among the developing countries
21.  In this light, we reestimate the 
regressions with the life expectancy at age 65 variable dropped and present the results 
in Table 2.  We see that the developing countries maintain the negative coefficients for 
the youth and elderly population shares, with that for the youth population turning 
statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (Reg 3b).  The absence of the 
life expectancy variable as an explanatory variable also does not affect the coefficients 
of the youth and elderly share variables for the developed countries; both coefficients 
are still positive with that of the elderly share remaining statistically significant (Reg 3a). 
Similar results are obtained using the working-age and elderly population shares 
when the regressions are estimated without the life expectancy at age 65 variable.   
                                                  
21 The correlation coefficient between life expectancy at age 65 and the elderly population share 
is 0.22 for the developed countries and 0.71 for the developing countries.   22  
Dropping the life expectancy variable has little bearing on the estimated coefficients of 
the population share variables.  The developing countries have a significant positive 
estimated coefficient of the working-age share and a negative coefficient for the elderly 
share (Reg 4b).  The developed countries, on the other hand, have the reverse, with the 
working-age share exhibiting a negative coefficient and the elderly share exhibiting a 
positive one (Reg 4a). 
As opposed to capturing the effects of age structure changes by using age-
structure shares, changes in age-structure of the population are instead measured by 
changes in the total dependency ratio in Reg 5a and 5b shown in Table 3.  As 
mentioned earlier, increases in the size of the youth or elderly population relative to that 
of the working-age population lead to increases in the total dependency ratio.  As such, 
an increase in the total dependency ratio has a postulated negative effect on the budget 
surplus.  We see that the regression results are basically in accord those from Table 1.  
Increases in the total dependency ratio tend to have a negative effect on the budget 
surplus only in the developing countries (Reg 5b) but not in the developed countries 
(Reg 5a).   
Recall that the total dependency ratio can be decomposed into the youth and the 
elderly dependency ratios.  We proceed to use the two dependency to measure age-
structure changes in the population.  It should be clear that increases in either of the 
dependency ratios are postulated to have a negative effect on the budget surplus share.  
In Table 3, we see that increases in either of the dependency ratios do indeed lead to a 
fall in the budget surplus share even though the effects are statistically insignificant, but 
only for the developing countries (Reg 6b).  For the developed countries, increases in 
the youth dependency ratio tend to decrease the budget surplus share, as theoretically 
postulated.  However, increases in the elderly dependency ratio tends to increase the 
budget surplus share, which is theoretically unexpected. 
To summarize, regardless of the various demographic indices used to proxy age-
structure changes used in our panel regressions, we see that empirical evidence 
supporting the age-structure theory of the budget deficit is found in developing countries, 
even though the evidence is rather weak given that the effects are not statistically 
significant.  Developed countries, on the other hand, give no indication whatsoever that 
increases in the elderly share of the population increases the budget deficit.  In fact, we 
consistent find evidence supporting the converse; increases in the elderly population in 
the developed country tends to decrease the budget deficit of central governments.   23  
Given that our population age-structure theory of the budget deficit can be 
viewed as an extension of the Cukierman Meltzer theory of negative bequest motives, 
we find it worthwhile to point out evidence suggesting bequest motives effects can be 
observed in developing countries.  All three of the estimated coefficients of the bequest 
motive variables are consistently of the postulated negative sign, with that of the life 
expectancy variable being significant at least at the 90 percent confidence level.  
On the other hand evidence supporting bequest motive effects are much weaker 
in the developed countries.  In all of the regressions mentioned above, only two out of 
three of the bequest motive variables have the theoretically postulated negative sign with 
the Gini variable consistently exhibiting a positive coefficient
22.  In our opinion, we think 
that it is much more than a coincidence that developing countries tend to exhibit 
relatively stronger evidence for the negative bequest motives and population age-
structure theories of the budget deficit.  We therefore argue that the above suggest that 
negative bequest motives do exist in developing countries and consequently age-
structure changes, such as population aging, do affect the budget deficit because it 
affects the population share of bequest constrained individuals. 
We also see from Table 1 that the tax-smoothing theory tends to hold for the 
developing countries but not for the developed countries.  The estimated coefficients for 
the unanticipated changes in per capita real government expenditure variables are 
negative and significant for both developed and developing countries, although it is 
highly significant only in the developing countries case.  On the other hand, we see that 
the estimated coefficient for the unanticipated changes in per capita real output is 
positive and significant for the developing countries and of the negative (incorrect) sign 




                                                  
22 We note that the estimated coefficient for the expected GDP growth rate for the developed 
countries is consistently of the theoretically postulated negative sign and statistically significant at 
least at the 90 confidence level.   24  
7. Conclusion 
  In view of the wide-spread concern with regard to population aging leading to the 
government expenditures of many countries to be unsustainable in the near future, this 
paper attempts to assess the severity with which changes in population age structure 
affect the budget deficit of national central governments.   By using fixed-effects panel 
regressions over 87 countries, I find that there is some evidence that  increases in the 
elderly and youth population shares tend to increase the budget deficit, but only in 
developing countries.  In addition, there is some indication that these age-structure 
effects on the budget deficit occur as a consequence of negative bequest motives. 
 
   25  
References : 
 
Aizenman, Joshua (1987).  "Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs."  Journal of 
International Economic Integration.  Vol. 2, No. 2, pp 12-28. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti (1995).  "The Politcal Economy of Budget Deficits."  IMF 
Staff Papers.  Vol. 42, No. 1, March 
 
Anderson, Gary M. (1986). "The US Federal Deficit and National Debt: A Political and Economic 
History." In Deficits, edited by James M. Buchanan, Charles K Rowley and Robert D. Tollison, 
Basil Blackwell Inc, pp. 9 – 46. 
 
Barro, Robert J. (1974).  "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth ?"  Journal of Political Economy. 
Vol. 82, No. 6, pp 1095-1117. 
 
Barro, Robert J. (1979).  "On the Determination of the Public Debt."  Journal of Political Economy. 
Vol. 87, No. 5, pp 940-971. 
 
Barro (1991) : "Comments on McCubbins" in Politics and Economics in the Eighties. ed by 
Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner.  University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Berg, Andrew and Jeffrey Sachs (1988).  "The Debt Crisis : Structural Explanations of Country 
Performance."  Journal of Development Economics.  Vol. 29, No. 3, pp 271-306. 
 
Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1997).  Demographic Transitions and Economic 
Miracles in Emerging Asia.  Working Paper, Harvard Institute for International Development, 
Harvard University. 
 
Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wager (1977).  Democracy in Deficit : The Political Legacy 
of Lord Keynes. Academic Press, New York. 
 
Buchanan, James M. and Jennifer Roback (1987).  The Incidence and Effects of Public Debt in 
the Absence of Fiscal Illusion.”  Public Finance Quarterly.  Vol. 15, pp. 5-25. 
 
Clingermayer, James C. (1991).  “An Intergenerational Transfer Model of State Debt Financing.”  
Public Choice.  Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 13-21. 
 
Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1992). "Seigniorage and Political 
Instability."  American Economic Review.  June, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp 537-555. 
 
Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer (1989).  "A Political Theory of Government Debt and 
Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework."  American Economic Review.  September 1989, Vol. 79, 
No. 4, pp 713-732. 
 
Culter, David M., James M. Poterba, Louise M. Sheiner and Lawrence H. Summers (1990).  “An 
Aging Society : Opportunity or Challenge ?”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.  No. 1, pp. 
1-73. 
 
Diamond, Peter A. (1965).  “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model.”  American Economic 
Review.  December, Vol.  55, pp. 1126-1150. 
 
Edwards, Sebastian and Guido Tabellini (1991).  "Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in 
Developing Countries."  Journal of International Money and Finance.  Vol. 10 (Supplement), pp. 
S16-S48.   26  
 
Eisner, Robert (1989).  “Budget Deficits: Rhetoric and Reality.”  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.  Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring, pp. 73-93. 
 
Elmendorf, Douglas W. and N. Gregory Mankiw (1998).  "Government Debt."  NBER Working 
Paper No. 6470, March. 
 
Griliches, Zvi (1986).  “Economic Data Issues.” in Handbook of Econometrics. (Volume 3) ed by 
Zvi Griliches and Michael D. Intriligator.  North-Holland, Netherlands.   
 
Hoover, Kevin D. and Mark Siegler (2000).  “Taxing and Spending in the Long View: The Causal 
Structure of U.S. Fiscal Policy, 1791-1913.”  Oxford Economic Papers. (forthcoming) 
 
Johnson, D. Gale (1998).  "Population and Economic Development."  Seminar Paper presented 
at University of California at Davis, November 13, 1998. 
 
Kelly, Allen C. (1988).  "Population Pressures, Saving, and Investment in the Third World : Some 
Puzzles."  Economic Development and Cultural Change.  Vol. 36, No. 3, pp 449-464. 
 
Kristov, Lorenzo, Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992).  "Pressure Groups and 
Redistribution."  Journal of Public Economics.  Vol. 48, pp. 135-163. 
 
Lindert, Peter H. (1996).  "What Limits Social Spending?"  Explorations in Economic History.  Vol. 
33, pp. 1-34. 
 
Mankiw, G. (1987)  “The Optimal Collection of Seigniorge:  Theory and Evidence.”  Journal of 
Monetary Economics.  Vol. 20, pp. 327-342. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. (1992).  “Measurement, Economic, and Political Issues of Debt and Deficits.”  In 
Marvin H. Kosters (ed), Fiscal Politics and the Budget Enforcement Act.  The American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI) Press. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. and Scott F. Richard (1981).  “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.”  
Journal of Political Economy.  Vol. 89, pp 914-927. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. and Scott F. Richard (1981).  “Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of 
Government.”  In Allan H. Meltzer, Alex Cukierman and Scott F. Richard.  Political Economy. 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Ross, Levine and David Renelt (1992).  “A sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions.”  American Economic Review.  September, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 942-963. 
 
Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey Sachs (1989a).  “Government Spending and Budget Deficit in the 
Industrial Countries.”  Economic Policy.  April, Vol 8 pp 100-132. 
 
Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey Sachs (1989b).  “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget 
Deficits in the Industrial Democracies.”  European Economic Review. Vol. 33, pp 903-938. 
 
Roubini, Nouriel (1991).  "Economic and Political Determinants of Budget Deficits in Developing 
Countries."  Journal of International Money and Finance.  Vol. 10 (Supplement), pp S49-S72. 
 
Tait, Alan A., Wilfrid L.M.Gratz and Barry J. Eichengreen (1979).  "International Comparisons of 
Taxation for Selected Developing Countries, 1972-76."  IMF Staff Papers.  Vol. 26, pp 123-156, 
March. 
   27  
Sahasakul, C. (1986).  “The U.S. Evidence on Optimal Taxation over Time.”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics.  Vol. 18, pp. 251-275. 
 
Schick, Allen (1983).  “The Distributive Congress.” in Schick, Allen (ed.) Making Economic Policy 
in Congress.  Washington D.C. American Enterprise Institute, pp. 257-74. 
 
Vaughn, Karen I. and Richard E. Wagner (1992).  Public Debt Controversies : An Essay in 





Chen, Derek Hung Chiat (1995).  Ageing and Intergenerational Transfers : The Issues.  
(Unpublished) Master's dissertation.  National University of Singapore, Republic of Singapore. 
Chen, Derek Hung Chiat (2001).  Intertemporal Excess Burdens, Bequest Motives, Informal 
Support and the Budget Deficit.  (Unpublished) Doctoral dissertation.  Univeristy of California at 
Davis. 
 
OECD (1988).  Ageing Populations : The Social Policy Implications.  OECD, Paris, 1988. 
 
O’Sullivan, Arther and Steven M. Sheffrin (1998).  Macroeconomics : Principles and Tools.  
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey. 
 
Rosen, Harvey S. (1999).  Public Finance.  (5
th Edition) Irwin / McGraw-Hill, U.S.A. 
 
Taylor, John B. (1998).  Principles of Macroeconomics. (2nd Edition) Houghton Mifflin Company, 
U.S.A. 
 
Todaro, Michael P. (1997)  Economic Development.  (6th Edition) Addison-Wesley Publishing 






Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire (1996). A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality.  World 
Bank Economic Review.  Vol. 10, pp. 565-591. 
 
Easterly, William (1997).  “Life During Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth.  Vol. 4, Issue 3, 
September 1999. 
 
Gastil, R.D. (1973-1989).  “The Comparative Survey of Freedom.”  Freedom at Issue.  Various 
Issues. 
 
Heston, Alan and Robert Summers (1991).  “The Penn World Table (Mark 5) : An Expanded Set 
of International Comparisons, 1950-1988.”  Quarterly Journal Economics.  May, pp. 327-368. 
 
International Monetary Fund.  International Financial Statistics.  Various Issues. 
 
International Monetary Fund (1998).  International Financial Statistics.  CD-Rom 
 
International Monetary Fund (1999).  International Financial Statistics.  CD-Rom 
 
Taylor, Charles Lewis (1985).  World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III, 1948-1982 
(ICPSR file 7761).   
   28  
United Nations (1993).  World Population Prospects : The 1992 Revision.  New York. 
 
United Nations (1995).  World Population Prospects : The 1994 Revision.  New York. 
 
World Bank (1993).  World Tables of Economic and Social Indicators, 1950-1992 (ICPSR file 
6159).  Washington, DC:  World Bank, International Economics Department (producer), 1993. 
Ann Arbor, MI : Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), 1997. 
   29  
 
Table 1
      Testing Bequest Motives and Tax-Smoothing Approaches      
    Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions       
          Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share           
Developed Developing Developed Developing
Years : 1975 -1992 Reg 1a Reg 1b Reg 2a Reg 2b
Control Variables
1. Dependent  Variable Lag 1 0.4008*** 0.7074*** 0.4018*** 0.7073***
(0.134) (0.082) (0.135) (0.082)
2. Index of Political Rights 0.0233** -0.0009 0.0232** -0.0006
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
3. Agricultural Share (-) -0.1046 -0.0855 -0.1072 -0.0876
(0.28) (0.074) (0.284) (0.073)
4. Manufacturing Share (+) 0.2475 -0.2522 0.2544 -0.2447
(0.215) (0.216) (0.216) (0.217)
5. Trade Share (+) -0.0033 0.0506** -0.004 0.0508**
(0.053) (0.024) (0.053) (0.024)
6. Urban Population Share (+) -0.0148*** -0.0039*** -0.0148*** -0.0041***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
7. Log of per capita Real GDP 0.2139*** 0.0509*** 0.2126*** 0.0553***
(0.048) (0.018) (0.048) (0.018)
8. Government Crises (-) -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0016
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
9. Cost of Debt Servicing (-) 0.0225 0.0126 0.0228 0.012
(0.065) (0.028) (0.065) (0.028)
10. Seigniorage (-) -0.0942 -0.125 -0.0906 -0.1297
(0.104) (0.079) (0.102) (0.08)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
11. Unanticipated changes -0.0453 -0.0913*** -0.0453* -0.0913***
       in real per capita govt exp (-) (0.027) (0.02) (0.027) (0.02)
       (4 year, simple average)
12. Unanticipated changes -0.0752 0.1071*** -0.0751 0.1065***
       in per capita real GDP (+) (0.052) (0.026) (0.053) (0.026)
       (4 year, simple average)
Bequest-Motives Variables
13. Expected per capita real -0.6268** -0.2173 -0.6144** -0.2628
       GDP Growth Rate (-) (0.296) (0.482) (0.297) (0.491)
       (25 year construction)
14. Gini Coefficient (-) 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0018
       (adjusted, smoothed) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0007) (0.0035)
15. Life Expectancy at age 65 (-) -0.0115 -0.0205* -0.0115 -0.0204*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
16. Youth Population Share (-) 0.1195 -0.2076
(0.19) (0.158)
17. Working-Age Population Share (+) -0.0854 0.1816
(0.202) (0.172)
18. Elderly Population Share (-) 0.4932* -0.9739 0.3857 -1.0107
(0.293) (0.983) (0.276) (0.981)
19. constant -1.1222*** 0.3264 -1.01*** 0.1662
(0.413) (0.198) (0.373) (0.185)
R-squared 0.8724 0.8351 0.8723 0.8414
Adjusted R-squared 0.8408 0.7909 0.8407 0.7989
F-Statistic 47.92 36.07 47.11 55.09
F-Stat  df 1 52 66 52 66
F-Stat df 2 210 250 210 250
Number of Countries 20 35 20 35
Number of Observations 263 318 263 318
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level respectively
Robust standard errors obtained using White's correction for heteroscedasticity.  30  
 
Table 2
      Testing Bequest Motives and Tax-Smoothing Approaches      
    Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions       
          Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share           
Developed Developing Developed Developing
Years : 1975 -1992 Reg 3a Reg 3b Reg 4a Reg 4b
Control Variables
1. Dependent  Variable Lag 1 0.4326*** 0.718*** 0.4332*** 0.7164***
(0.127) (0.085) (0.128) (0.085)
2. Index of Political Rights 0.0242*** -0.0009 0.024*** -0.0006
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
3. Agricultural Share (-) -0.0527 -0.0939 -0.0531 -0.0957
(0.273) (0.075) (0.277) (0.074)
4. Manufacturing Share (+) 0.2484 -0.2389 0.2559 -0.2336
(0.22) (0.215) (0.221) (0.216)
5. Trade Share (+) -0.0035 0.0473* -0.0047 0.0469*
(0.053) (0.024) (0.053) (0.024)
6. Urban Population Share (+) -0.0129*** -0.0039*** -0.013*** -0.0043***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
7. Log of per capita Real GDP 0.191*** 0.0462*** 0.1896*** 0.0517***
(0.046) (0.017) (0.046) (0.017)
8. Government Crises (-) -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0031
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
9. Cost of Debt Servicing (-) 0.0347 0.0135 0.035 0.0133
(0.065) (0.03) (0.065) (0.029)
10. Seigniorage (-) -0.0897 -0.1209 -0.0856 -0.1236
(0.1) (0.078) (0.099) (0.079)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
11. Unanticipated changes -0.0489* -0.0913*** -0.049* -0.0912***
       in real per capita govt exp (-) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
       (4 year, simple average)
12. Unanticipated changes -0.0687 0.1097*** -0.0686 0.1089***
       in per capita real GDP (+) (0.051) (0.026) (0.051) (0.026)
       (4 year, simple average)
Bequest-Motives Variables
13. Expected per capita real -0.6021** 0.0336 -0.586* -0.0121
       GDP Growth Rate (-) (0.297) (0.498) (0.299) (0.501)
       (25 year construction)
14. Gini Coefficient (-) 0.0010 -0.0015 0.0010 -0.0021
       (adjusted, smoothed) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0007) (0.0035)
15. Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)
16. Youth Population Share (-) 0.0922 -0.2844*
(0.193) (0.161)
17. Working-Age Population Share (+) -0.0488 0.2943*
(0.209) (0.171)
18. Elderly Population Share (-) 0.5076* -1.1418 0.4291 -1.2178
(0.294) (0.982) (0.288) (0.976)
19. constant -1.1902*** 0.0181 -1.1109*** -0.2338*
(0.401) (0.148) (0.36) (0.136)
R-squared 0.8691 0.8350 0.8690 0.8464
Adjusted R-squared 0.8375 0.7917 0.8374 0.8060
F-Statistic 45.96 44.94 45.21 70.35
F - S t a t   d f  1 5 16 55 16 5
F-Stat df 2 211 251 211 251
Number of Countries 20 35 20 35
Number of Observations 263 318 263 318
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level respectively
Robust standard errors obtained using White's correction for heteroscedasticity.  31  
 
Table 3
      Testing Bequest Motives and Tax-Smoothing Approaches      
    Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions       
          Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share           
Developed Developing Developed Developing
Years : 1975 -1992 Reg 5a Reg 5b Reg 6a Reg 6b
Control Variables
1. Dependent  Variable Lag 1 0.4124*** 0.7121*** 0.4005*** 0.7086***
(0.134) (0.083) (0.135) (0.083)
2. Index of Political Rights 0.0222** -0.0002 0.0232** -0.0007
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
3. Agricultural Share (-) -0.1222 -0.0906 -0.1072 -0.0883
(0.281) (0.073) (0.28) (0.073)
4. Manufacturing Share (+) 0.2595 -0.2317 0.2525 -0.2416
(0.22) (0.216) (0.215) (0.216)
5. Trade Share (+) -0.0054 0.049** -0.0038 0.0502**
(0.053) (0.024) (0.053) (0.024)
6. Urban Population Share (+) -0.0149*** -0.0035*** -0.0149*** -0.0039***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
7. Log of per capita Real GDP 0.221*** 0.0532*** 0.2126*** 0.0549***
(0.048) (0.018) (0.048) (0.018)
8. Government Crises (-) -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.00003 -0.0014
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
9. Cost of Debt Servicing (-) 0.0142 0.0125 0.0241 0.012
(0.065) (0.028) (0.065) (0.028)
10. Seigniorage (-) -0.1102 -0.1248 -0.0877 -0.1269
(0.104) (0.079) (0.103) (0.079)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
11. Unanticipated changes -0.0461 -0.0913*** -0.0452* -0.0914***
       in real per capita govt exp (-) (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.02)
       (4 year, simple average)
12. Unanticipated changes -0.077 0.1073*** -0.0749 0.107***
       in per capita real GDP (+) (0.053) (0.026) (0.052) (0.026)
       (4 year, simple average)
Bequest-Motives Variables
13. Expected per capita real -0.7784** -0.2956 -0.6116** -0.2293
       GDP Growth Rate (-) (0.319) (0.451) (0.297) (0.478)
       (25 year construction)
14. Gini Coefficient (-) -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0013
       (adjusted, smoothed) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0007) (0.0033)
15. Life Expectancy at age 65 (-) -0.0122 -0.0218** -0.0115 -0.0206*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
16. Total Dependency Ratio (-) 0.0627 -0.0457
(0.082) (0.057)
17. Youth Dependency Ratio (-) -0.0012 -0.0348
(0.092) (0.065)
18. Elderly Dependency Ratio (-) 0.266* -0.4966
(0.153) (0.578)
19. constant -1.1082*** 0.1958 -1.0647*** 0.2461
(0.406) (0.183) (0.41) (0.183)
R-squared 0.8703 0.8305 0.8724 0.8344
Adjusted R-squared 0.8389 0.7859 0.8408 0.7900
F-Statistic 50.99 35.68 46.94 36.16
F - S t a t   d f  1 5 16 55 26 6
F-Stat df 2 211 251 210 250
Number of Countries 20 35 20 35
Number of Observations 263 318 263 318
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level respectively
Robust standard errors obtained using White's correction for heteroscedasticity.  32  
APPENDIX  
 
A.1  Description of Data 
The intended coverage of the regression is from 1950 to 1995 and covers 87 
countries.  The complete list of countries is presented in the chapter appendix.  Table A 
presents the sources and definitions of all raw data used. 
 
 
A.2  How the Variables are Constructed 
Dependent Variable 
The fiscal surplus of the central government as a share of GDP in year t is defined as 





1.  Index of political rights in year t.  The index runs from “1” to “7”, with “1” denoting 
the highest level political rights or most political freedom. 
 
2.  Agricultural share in year t = ratio of the value added in the agricultural sector in 
year t to nominal GDP in year t. 
 
3.  Manufacturing share in year t = ratio of the value added in the manufacturing 
sector in year t to nominal GDP in year t. 
 
4.  Trade share in year t = ratio of the sum of imports and exports in year t to 
nominal GDP in year t. 
 
5.  Urban population share in year t = ratio of urban population in year t to total 
population in year t. 
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6.  Political instability in year t = number of government crises in year t. 
 
7. Development  variable:  log of per capita real GDP in year t. 
 
  The measurement of per capita real GDP needs to be comparable across 
countries.  For this reason, data for this variable was obtained from the Heston-
Summers data set “Penn World Tables Mark 5.6” (Heston and Summers, 1991)
23.  The 
measure of real GDP used in this paper will be real GDP per capita measured in 
constant dollars that has been adjusted for changes in the terms of trade, using 1985 
international prices for domestic absorption (consumption, investment and government 
purchases) and current international prices for exports and imports.  This measured was 
devised to take account of changes in the value of the country’s output arising from 
changes in its terms of trade as well as changes in its production.  The domestic 
absorption part is calculated using 1985 international prices.  However, the net foreign 
balance is valued in current prices instead of 1985 prices.  This is to allow for the part of 
the country’s increased well being that results form lower prices paid for imports or 
higher prices received for exports. 
 
8.  Seigniorage share = the ratio of the difference in the stock of reserve money 
between year t and year t-1 to that of nominal GDP in year t. 
 
9.  Cost of debt servicing = annual change of the difference between the real interest 
rate and the real GDP growth rate, multiplied by lagged debt-GDP ratio, where the 
real interest rate is defined as 
 
1
year t in  Deflator    GDP
1 - year t in  Deflator    GDP












                                                  
23 The Penn World Tables display a set of national accounts economic time series covering a 
large number of countries.  Its unique feature is that its expenditure entries are denominated in a 
common set of prices in a common currency so that real international quantity comparisons can 
be made both countries and over time; see Summers and Heston (1991).   34  
Tax-Smoothing Variables 
Recall that the tax smoothing approach postulates that unanticipated increases in 
government expenditure will tend increase the budget deficit (and vice versa), while 
unanticipated increases in output will tend decrease the budget deficit (and vice versa).  
To obtain a proxy for unanticipated changes in per capita real government expenditures, 
we shall use the percentage deviation of the current level from the expected level of per 











t G   is the level of real per capita government expenditure in year t 
t G   is the expected level of per capita real government expenditure in year t 
constructed by projecting the level of per capita real government expenditure in 
year t-1 by using an estimated annual growth rate of per capita real government 
expenditure.  The estimated annual growth rate is the simple average of the 
previous three annual growth rates of per capita real government expenditure. 
 
Similarly, to account for unanticipated changes in per capita output of the 
economy, we shall use the percentage deviation of the current level of real per capita 










t Y   is the level of real per capita GDP in year t 
t Y   is the expected level of real per capita GDP in year t constructed by projecting 
the level of per capita real GDP in year t-1 by using an estimated annual growth 
rate of per capita output.  The estimated annual growth rate is the OLS slope 
coefficient is the simple average of the previous three annual growth rates of the 
log of per capita real GDP. 
 
Some will undoubtedly find the choice of previous 4 years for estimating the annual 
growth rate of per capita real government expenditure and output to be extremely 
arbitrary
24.  The sensitivity analyses section in the appendix presents regression results 
                                                  
24 Note that using the simple average of the previous 3 annual growth rates is equivalent to using 
4 years of data. 
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where alternative numbers of years, as well as a different method, are used to estimate 
annual growth rates for both tax-smoothing variables
25. 
 
Negative Bequest Motive Regressors 
1.  Expected per capita real GDP growth rate of the economy 
  Recall that Cukierman and Meltzer postulated that as the expected real GDP 
growth rate increases, people would tend to expect future generations to have a higher 
standard of living relative to the current generation.  Thus, this tends to increase the 
share of bequest-constrained individuals in the population.  In this light, expected per 
capita real GDP growth rate, rather than the expected growth rate in aggregate GDP, is 
more intuitively appealing as a proxy for the expected welfare of future generations.   
This was constructed as the slope coefficient of a “rolling regression” of the preceding 25 
years' log of the real per capita GDP on a time trend.  More specifically, the expected 
per capita real GDP growth rate of the economy in year t would be the slope coefficient 
obtained when the log of real per capita GDP for the years t-1 through t-25 is linearly 
regressed on a time trend
26. 
 
2.  The distribution of income or total wealth 
  A suitable proxy for the spread of the income distribution is the Gini coefficient.  
Data for Gini coefficients are from Deininger and Squire (1996) and only observations 
that are in the "accepted" category are used.  Observations in this category are 
considered by Deininger and Squire to be relatively more consistent, more accurately 
measured, and reliable.  However, this data set includes Gini coefficients of different 
measures.  Two different measures are income and expenditure based Gini coefficients.  
Since individuals are better able to smooth expenditure as opposed to income, Gini 
coefficients based on expenditure measures are, ceteris paribus, smaller than those 
based on income.  Deininger and Squire note that the mean difference between the two 
                                                  
25 Roubini and Sachs (1989a) model unanticipated changes in output for a country as the 
deviation of actual output from its average value over the previous three years in that country.  
However, note that since output usually has an upward trend, this method will tend have an 
upward bias in unanticipated increases in output, since the measure of average value of output 
will consistently under-predict the true “expected value”.  
 
26 The choice of using the past 25 years is somewhat arbitrary.  Alternatives, such as using data 
on the log of per capita  GDP of the past 15, 20 and 30 years, have been presented in the 
sensitivity analyses in Chen (2001). 
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is about 6.6 out of 100, and recommend adding the difference of 6.6 between 
expenditure-based and income based coefficients to the expenditure based Gini 
coefficients in the sample
27 to avoid the exclusion of a substantial number of countries.  
We follow their suggestion. 
  Another problem with the data set was that the available observations were 
irregularly spaced and relatively scarce.  We note that the true gross income 
distributions tend to change very slowly and that there will be unavoidable 
inconsistencies in the measurement of the Gini coefficient, (both across countries and 
across time).  In order to minimize the effect of extreme observations and to increase the 
number of annual observations, the available data were smoothed using locally weighted 
scatterplot smoothing (lowess) and then linear interpolation was performed using the 
new smoothed observations
28.  The “adjusted and smoothed” Gini coefficients were then 
used in the regressions
29. 
 
3.  Expected longevity 
The bequest motives model postulates that the longer the period of time an 
individual spends in retirement, the more likely he or she is likely to be bequest-
constrained.  The Proposition thus indicates that an increase in expected longevity will 
lead to a larger budget deficit, under majority rule. 
                                                  
27 Such an adjustment, they argue, would be supported by the fact that the difference between 
income and expenditure based Gini coefficient does not does not to seem to follow any 
distinguishing pattern, except that it narrows over time.  Thus it is not significantly correlated at 
the 5% levels with levels of income, continent dummies or the average levels of the Gini in the 
country but correlated negatively (with a correlated of 0.47) with time. 
 
28 The smoothed values are obtained by running a regression of the original Gini coefficient data 
on time.  Each smoothed value of the Gini coefficient is generated using the original Gini 
coefficient for that particular year and a small amount information of the actual Gini coefficients 
observed in the past and future years.  In this method, the regression is weighted so that the 
central point, the Gini coefficient in year t (ginit, yeart) gets the highest weight and points farther 
away (based on the distance  t s gini gini − receive less.  The estimated regression is then used 
to predict the smoothed value  t i n giˆ  based on  t gini only.  The procedure is repeated to obtain 
the remaining smoothed values, which means a separated weighted regression is estimated for 
every point in the data.  A bandwidth of 0.5 was used, which implies that centered subsets of 50 
per cent of the observations are used for calculating smoothed values for each point.  The 
greater the bandwidth, the greater the smoothing. 
 
29 The results of panel regressions in which the Gini coefficients are neither adjusted nor 
smoothed are presented in the appendix for comparison. 
   37  
In view of the above, a very appropriate variable for use as a proxy for the 
expected time an individual expects to spend in retirement is life expectancy at age 65
30.  
However, across the 87 countries included in the sample, there is a less than 
satisfactory number of observations for life expectancy at age 65.  The problem of 
insufficient data is especially severe for the less developed countries, with some of them 
having as few as 3 observations out of the possible 45 years of data.  On the other hand, 
data for life expectancy at birth is relatively more abundant with annual observations 
being available even for the less developed countries.  Given the high correlation 
between life expectancy at age 65 and life expectancy at birth
31, a simple way to get 
around problem of having insufficient number of observations for "life expectancy at age 
65" would have been to use "life expectancy at birth" as a proxy.  However, in order to 
get a more accurate representation of the expected time an individual spends in 
retirement, a less crude technique was used.  This technique involves the use of the 
available data on life expectancy at birth and at age 65 to make out of sample 
predictions for years in which data on life expectancy at birth is available but life 
expectancy at age 65 is not.  For details, please refer to the construction of Method 2 of 





Youth Population Share = the ratio of the number of persons aged 14 and younger in 
year t to the total number of persons in the population in year t. 
 
Working-Age Population Share = the ratio of the number of persons aged between 15 
and 64 in year t to the total number of persons in the 
population in year t. 
 
Elderly Population Share = the ratio of the number of persons aged 65 and over in year t 
to the total number of persons in the population in year t. 
 
                                                  
30 The expected additional number of years a person is expected to live, given that he or she has 
survived until age 65. 
 
31 Based on the available 925 observations of the two life expectancies that coincide in terms of 
the country and year in our data set, we obtained a correlation coefficient of 0.8015.   38  
Total Dependency Ratio = ratio of the sum of youth and elderly population in year t 
relative to the total population in year t 
 
Youth Dependency Ratio = ratio of the youth population in year t relative to the total 
population in year t 
 
Elderly Dependency Ratio = ratio of the elderly population in year t relative to the total 
population in year t 
 




Table A:  Description of Raw Data
Variable Definition Frequency Source
Surplus or deficit (-) Overall budget surplus of the central government Annual IFS, WB, WDI
Debt Total nominal debt issued by the central government Annual IFS, WDI
Current revenue All government revenue from taxes and nonrepayable Annual WDI
 receipts except grants
Current expenditure All government expenditure excluding payments for  Annual WDI
capital assets or goods and services to be used in the 
production of capital assets
Nominal GDP Nominal Gross Domestic Product at market prices Annual IFS, WB, WDI
Agriculture Value added in the agricultural sector Annual WB, WDI
Manufacturing Value added in the manufacturing sector Annual WB, WDI
Imports Merchandise imports c.i.f. (US$) Annual IFS, WB, WDI
Exports Total mechandise exports f.o.b. (US$) Annual IFS, WB, WDI
Exchange rate Units of national currency per US dollar (Annual Average) Annual IFS, WB, WDI
Urban population  The ratio of the urban population over the total population Annual WB, WDI
share multiplied by 100
Number of  The number of major government crisis, defined as any Decade Easterly (1997)
government crises rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the Average
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of
revolt aimed at such overthrow
Political rights Index from 1 to 7.  A "1" represents the highest level of Annual Gastil (1973-1989),
political rights while a "7" represents the lowest. (1990)
Per capita  Measured in constant dollars.  Adjusted for changes Annual Heston and
real GDP in the terms of trade, using 1985 international prices Summers (1991)
for domestic absorption and current prices for
exports and imports.
Deposit  The rate paid by commercial or similar banks for Annual IFS, WDI
interest rates demand, time, or savings deposits.
GDP deflator GDP deflator (Base=1990) Annual WB, WDI
Reserve money Monetary base Annual IFS
Income Distribution Gini Coefficient Annual Deininger and
Squire (1996)
Youth Population Number of persons aged 14 and below Annual WDI
Working-age Population Number of persons aged between 14 and 64 Annual WDI
Elderly population Number of persons aged 65 and above Annual WDI
Total population Total number of persons in the population Annual WDI, IFS
Elderly life  Life expectancy at age 65 Annual Demographic
expectancy Yearbook
Life expectancy Life expectancy at age 0 Annual WB, WDI
at birth
WB = World Bank (1983)
WDI = World Bank (1997), (1999)
IFS = International Monetary Fund (1998), (1999)
Demographic Yearbook (various issues)